Deep CO 2 mitigation provides a challenge to fossil fuel-fired power industry in liberalized electricity market process. To motivate generator to carry out mitigation action, this article proposed a novel dispatch model for wholesale electricity market under consideration of CO 2 emission trade. It couples carbon market with electricity market and utilizes a price-quantity uncorrelated auction way to operate both CO 2 allowances and power energy trade. Specifically, this CO 2 saving dispatch model works as a dynamic process of, (i) electricity and environment regulators coordinately issue regulatory information; (ii) initial CO 2 allowances allocation through carbon market auction; (iii) load demands allocation through wholesale market auction; and (iv) CO 2 allowances submarket transaction. This article builds two stochastic mathematical programmings to explore generator's auction decision in both carbon market and wholesale market, which provides its optimal price-quantity bid curve for CO 2 allowances and power energy in each market. Through piece-wise adding up individual demand curve (supply curve) and matching with total supplied allowances (load demanded), market equilibrium is reached. Under this dispatch model, price upper-bound of bid allowances of generators is upward ordered and price lower-bound of bid electricity is downward ordered, according to their operational advantage from weak to strong. Meanwhile their bid electricity upper-bound gets respective capacity constraint or market share regulation. These features imply that the proposed model can prompt economic dispatch, improve resources allocation efficiency and bring about CO 2 mitigation effect. Numerical simulations also verified the validity of this CO 2 saving dispatch model.
Introduction
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has done huge efforts on controlling global CO 2 emission. Since UNFCCC passed the Paris Agreement at the end of 2015, last year saw the Katowice Climate Change Conference agreed on detail rules to urge its member countries to implement this Agreement. As a response to the Paris Agreement, Chinese government committed to abate 60%-65% of CO 2 emissions in 2030 year in accordance with its 2005 level. Electricity industry, featured as the largest emission sector in China (for example, in 2013 national coal-fired generation shared 73.8% of produced electricity thereof contributed to 42% of total CO 2 emissions), is undergoing liberalized market reformation. It is a challenge to generators to carry out CO 2 abatement under electricity market reforming process.
In line with competitive degree in electric power system, electricity market structure may be segmented into monopoly market, purchase-agent market, wholesale competition market and retail competition market [1] . Concerning Chinese electricity market reforming progress the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) suggests that, purchase-agent market is a transforming structure, wholesale market is a goal structure, and retail competition market is the final structure [2] . However, in recent articles many researchers did not distinguish purchase-agent market from wholesale competition market.
In liberalized electricity market process, price regulation acts as a critical role to incorporate CO 2 emissions abatement [3] . For example, through setting incentive price Australia electricity market design has taken renewable energy generation into dispatch schedule [4] . As renewable energy generation has characteristics of variability and uncertainty, Ela et al. [5] and Milligan et al. [6] suggest that pay-for-performance wholesale market design may promote independent system operator (ISO) to procure renewable electricity. Concerning current Germany energy-only market design (EOM), Keles et al. [7] and Bublitz et al. [8] hold that an EOM extended with a strategic reserve can enhance supply security in a market with high share of renewable electricity. To achieve CO 2 abatement goal stipulated in the Paris agreement, there is an urgent need for market design to increase the compatibility among electricity market and carbon market [9] . As reported by Hogan [10] , successful electricity market design should be built on the principles of auction-based, environment-friendly and security-constrained economic dispatch.
In theory, combinatorial auction is extensively adopted to design both electricity market and carbon market to promote CO 2 abatement in power industry. Through efficient market design, the former may motivate power system economic dispatch then brings indirect abatement effect, correspondingly, the latter has a benefit of optimizing CO 2 allowances allocation hence gets direct abatement effect. Combinatorial auction allows bidder to bid on a combination of commodities rather than single-unit, and has an advantage to overcome the exposure problem in a multi-unit commodities auction that is an inherent requirement of bid decision in both electricity market and carbon market [11] . In recent literature, Zaidi et al. [12] introduce a combinatorial auction to efficiently allocate common energy storage system in a smart microgrid. Zaidi and Hong [13] design a combinatorial double auction mechanism to explore electricity trade among multiple microgrids.
In electricity market, uniform-price auction and pay-as-bid auction are known as two main kinds of combinatorial auction. Payment for winners of the former is settled as the bid price of the last in-merit dispatch order (i.e. uniform market clearing price, MCP), while the latter is settled as respective winner's bid price (i.e. pay-as-bid, PAB) [14] . PAB auction may dampen the market power, control tacit collusion, and reduce price volatility caused by load forecast bias [15] [16] [17] . However, under this auction generators are motivated to bid price higher than their marginal cost, therefore it is characterized as low efficiency [15, 18] . Contrast with PAB auction, MCP auction can incentivize generators to reveal their true cost information, as a consequence brings about equality and efficiency [18] [19] . In Italy electricity market liberalized process, independent system operator (ISO) permitted generators to enjoy nondiscriminatory transmission service and the settlement implemented a uniform regional price. Beraldi el al. [20] simulates this market then support that MCP auction has benefits to reinforce system security and operational efficiency. In both Australia and New Zealand electricity market, there were a multi-round combinatorial auction in operation. In line with Contreras et al. [21] , this auction can minimize power system cost. Contreras et al. [21] further make a comparison to social welfare change among the three kinds of auction: price-quantity uncorrelated single-round auction, price-quantity correlated single-round auction, price-quantity uncorrelated multi-round auction, suggesting that the latter is more efficient. Obviously, the higher efficiency of resources allocation in electricity market, the greater indirect CO 2 abatement effect is brought by economic dispatch pathway.
To incentivize generators to implement CO 2 mitigation under constraints of electricity supply balancing with load demand, based on literature [9, 10, 12, 18, 21] , this paper developed a novel dispatch model for wholesale electricity market on condition of CO 2 emissions trade. It couples carbon market with electricity market and utilizes price-quantity uncorrelated multi-round auction to organize both CO 2 allowances and power energy trade. As seen in section 4, reserve price of generators is ordered in line with their operational advantage, meanwhile their maximum bid quantity is equal to either respective capacity constraint or market share regulation. Therefore, the proposed dispatch model can promote economic dispatch in a way avoiding economic withholding as well as physical withholding [1] in electricity market and bring about CO 2 mitigation effect, not only direct from carbon market but also indirect from electricity market.
The following part is organized as, Section 2 depicts assumptions and framework of the proposed CO 2 saving dispatch model. Section 3 analyzes price-quantity auction for CO 2 allowances allocation in carbon market. Section 4 explores price-quantity auction for power energy allocation in wholesale market as well as CO 2 submarket trade. To make an intuitive version of CO 2 mitigation effect, section 5 carries out a numerical simulation as well as a comparison among the proposed dispatch model, average allocating allowances dispatch model and average allocating load model. Finally, a brief conclusion is summarized in section 6.
Model Description

Assumptions
As seen in section 1, existing power dispatch model in wholesale market needs to be compatible with CO 2 abatement policies to motivate generator to reduce emissions. This article addresses the compatibility problem by making an optimal dispatch model for wholesale market under consideration of CO 2 emissions trade. To get model design more practical and be set on robust theoretical basis, it is necessary to emphasize the following assumptions:
i. The wholesale market is generation side open-up, regional grid company (or ISO) is the single purchaser, bidders are independent power producer (IPPs), and all loads are transacted through MCP auction way. ii. Power system keeps balance between loads and generations. The primary goal of power industry is to supply electricity to meet the demand for national economy development [22] . Elmaghraby [23] and Song et al. [24] also hold that a successful wholesale market design has a feature of all loads being dispatched. iii. The wholesale market has n coal-fired generators and each owns one generation unit. 
CO 2 Saving Dispatch Model
This section developed an optimal dispatch model for wholesale market coupled with emissions trade to incentivize generator to carry out CO 2 abatement. Its framework is described as follow:
Previously, market regulators proclaim the regulatory information. Concretely, electricity regulator needs to issue information on yearly load demand, grid line loss rate, electricity price restriction and market share regulation. Concerning electricity regulation, environment regulator releases CO 2 allowances cap, carbon price restriction, yardstick emission intensity, default emission penalty rate and CO 2 submarket transaction rate.
Then, environment regulator organizes initial CO 2 allowances trade in carbon market. As a necessary production factor, generators bid for allowances through the first sealed price-quantity MCP auction way. To leave more decision choices for allowances utilization and carry out power system CO 2 mitigation, generators may trade allowances after wholesale electricity transaction. In submarket, CO 2 allowances may be traded among generators or be purchased from environment regulator. For the former way, purchaser will be charged by additional transaction cost; for the latter way, it needs to pay the highest price composed of MCP, penalty and additional transaction cost.
Thereafter, electricity regulator and ISO organize wholesale market transaction by employing the MCP combinatorial auction approach.
In the end, environment regulator arranges carbon submarket transaction to fulfill CO 2 allowances allocation among generators. This optimal dispatch model is a dynamic process being composed of "electricity regulatory information， environment regulatory information，generators bid for CO 2 allowances， generators bid for electricity and CO 2 submarket transaction". As seen in sections 3-5, it has a benefit to enhance compatibility between carbon market and wholesale electricity market, consequently may motivate generators to reduce CO 2 emissions on condition of electricity supply balancing with load demand.
As a main improvement, the proposed dispatch model applies the first sealed price-quantity combinatorial auction [25] [26] [27] to organize market transaction. In carbon market it has many advantages over CO 2 allocation free of charge, such as price discovery, avoiding windfall profits as well as carbon leakage problem [28] [29] . In wholesale market it can improve market efficiency, promote economic dispatch and bring about indirect CO 2 mitigation effect. Setting floor and ceiling to price may overcome it fluctuating too much therein increase market stability, both in carbon market and in electricity market.
Emission intensity slack factor j m , defined as ( ) To pursue expected profit, in both carbon market and electricity market generator needs to concern the profitability of CO 2 allowances. This means that generator needs to take CO 2 submarket possible transaction into consideration when making decision at each stage. As shown in Figure 1 , generator may trade CO 2 allowances with other generators or directly purchase allowances from environment regulator. However, for the former way, purchaser will be charged with extra submarket charge rate β ; for the latter way, it will pay the highest price composed of MCP, default emission fine rate α and submarket charge rate β . Since power system requires balancing generation and load demand in real time, during peak load period the ISO needs to meet load demand at a sacrifice of emissions increased appropriately. But in this case environment regulator may punish those generators whose CO 2 intensity is higher than yardstick intensity thus transfer part of their profit into social welfare. Under this CO 2 saving dispatch model, generator not only needs to bid for CO 2 allowances but also needs to bid for power energy in a first sealed price-quantity uncorrelated MCP auction way. In auction terminology, each round is a homogenous commodity combinatorial auction [30] [31] , which is also main improvement of the new dispatch model, as a result of that, more efficient to resources allocation.
Initial CO 2 Allowances Trade
Generator's Decision Making in Initial Carbon Market
To produce electricity, generator needs to bid for CO 2 allowances in carbon market. Rationally, its decision on optimal price-quantity demand function is based on all available public or private information. In line with section 2.2 and assumptions (i) to (v), generator's decision can be modeled as the following stochastic math programming, of which objective function is maximization of expected profit, and constraints include technical restriction, price regulation and market share restriction. Since generator cannot get exact data on electricity price and operational active power at this stage, it may assume them as a uniform distribution stochastic variable in reasonable range. Note that in CO 2 submarket transaction, selling surplus allowances will not only be charged with extra transaction cost, but also suffer a probability of transaction failure. On the other hand, purchasing shortage allowances will pay higher price than MCP, despite from other generators or from environment regulator. Therefore the profitability of CO 2 allowances inclines it to be utilized as a production factor of generation, rather than a speculative instrument through market trade.
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Eq. 1 shows that generator's expected revenue is the multiples of expected electricity price and selling electricity calculated as bid CO2 allowances. Its expected cost is composed of allowances cost, expected fuel cost and potential emission penalty. In line with literature [32] [33] , this article concerns quadratic fuel consumption function, i.e., ( )
.
Eq. 2 is electricity market share regulation embodied in carbon market, meaning that potential selling electricity is no more than the amount determined by market share. Eqs. 6-7 are respective probability density function of operational active power and electricity price.
Generator's Demand Function
Through solving the above mathematical programming, generator's optimal CO 2 allowances bid curve is obtained.
In probability theory, suppose zero-probability event is equivalent to impossible event. Then Eqs. 4 and 5 are included in Eqs. 6 and 7, respectively. For convenience, denoting expected electricity price as ( ) 
, .
Eqs. 3, 6 and 7 into Eq. 1, order marginal profit 0
thus optimal bid price curve is solved as ( ) 
According to CO 2 submarket transaction rules specified in section 2.2, under optimal bid price constraint, generator's optimal bid allowances equals to its upper-bound 1 , and vice versa. Taking Eq. 8 constraint into consideration, generator's optimal price-quantity bid curve in carbon market is 
Given a deep exploration, generator's decision making is corresponding to the principles of incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints [8, 10] in market design theory. As a consequence, all optimal bid curves get a Nash equilibrium in carbon market. 
Initial CO 2 Allowances Allocation
Let demand equals to supply, the market equilibrium is reached (see Eq. 12). To incentivize generator to control CO 2 intensity in a way raising emission cost appropriately, environment regulator chooses upper-bound of emission critical price range (ECPR) as market clearing price (MCP). As seen in Eq. 13, ECPR is defined as the price interval where line 
Let's denote ECPR as ( ) 
Since ECPR upper-bound is equal to bid price upper-bound of marginal winner, ECPR pricing rule has a policy effect of transferring part of profit of marginal winner into social welfare as well as overcoming winner's curse [11, 13] . When allocating allowances among winners, environment regulator sets the rule as, (i) complete match generators having bid allowances where price is higher than ECPR upper-bound; (ii) average allocate the spare allowances among generators having bid allowances where price is at ECPR interval but no bid allowances where price is higher than ECPR upper-bound. The spare CO 2 allowances is calculated by Eq. (14) . The ECPR allocation rule also has a policy effect to prior allocate CO 2 allowances to generators characterized as emission advantage (i.e., higher MERS).
Wholesale Electricity Market and CO 2 Submarket Trade
Generator's Decision Making in Wholesale Electricity Market
Through carbon market auction CO 2 allowances is allocated and its MCP price is determined, which alleviates decision uncertainty to bid electricity in wholesale market. As information on operational active power, purchase and sell price of CO 2 allowances in submarket are still unknown accurately, generator may assume these parameters are stochastic variables subject to a uniform distribution in appropriate range. In line with section 2.1, 2.2 and 3.3, generator's decision on bid curve in wholesale market can be modeled as the following stochastic math programming. 
. st allowances suffers a failure.
Generator's Supply Function
To get optimal price-quantity bid curve in wholesale market, this section solves the above mathematical programming. 
For convenience, sign ( ) 
To put the above three items together, generator's optimal price-quantity bid curve is 
Through a deep exploration, bid electricity of generators having strengths on power production (i.e., lower marginal power cost of start-generation, MPCS or * wj ρ ) will be prior dispatched. Moreover, changing bid electricity interval or bid price interval in Eq. 26 will inevitably cause an expected profit loss. Eq. 26 means that generator's supply function may overcome speculation through physical withholding or economic withholding [17, 22] hence holds the intrinsic requirement of economic dispatch, in this way brings about indirect CO 2 saving effect. Similar to carbon market auction, all individual supply functions reach a Nash equilibrium in wholesale market.
Electricity Dispatch and CO 2 Submarket Trade
Similarly, let's separate n generators as M sets according to isoquant MPCS and define the following index function. 
Equilibrium price-quantity set (EPQS) and EPS can be written as
Obviously, ** t Ω ≠ ∅ .
When dispatching electricity ISO laid the rule as, prior dispatch bid electricity of generators having bid quantity where price is lower than EPS lower-bound, thereafter average dispatch the spare electricity among generators having bid quantity at EPS lower-bound price. Also, this EPS dispatch rule has positive policy effects on resources allocation and CO 2 mitigation.
Simulation
Data Process
This section provides a numerical simulation to give an intuitive version on validity of the proposed CO 2 saving dispatch model. Assume there are 8 generators in wholesale competitive market and respective operational information is given below. Table 1 is fuel consumption function (ton/hour). Table 2 is upper-and lower-bound active power (MW), CO 2 emission intensity (ton/MWh), coal price (CNY/ton) as well as self-consumed electricity rate. Regulatory information released by electricity regulator is given below, predicted load demand is 3.0×10 6 MWh, grid line loss rate is 0.06, electricity price range is 200-400 CNY/MWh, and market share is no higher than 0.3. Based on electricity regulatory information, environment regulator releases the following information, supplied allowances is 1590 kiloton, carbon price range is 10-50 CNY/ton, yardstick CO 2 intensity is 0.5 ton/MWh, default emission penalty rate is 0.2, and CO 2 submarket transaction charge rate is 0.1. is negative for generator 7 and 8, their bid CO 2 allowances is zero. For other generators 1-6, respective bid allowances is 297.6, 500.9, 601.0, 707.9, 758.4 and 809.0 kiloton, correspondingly their bid price upper-bound is 13.33 CNY/tCO 2 for generator 6 and 50 CNY/tCO 2 for generators 1-5. The result verified allocation efficiency in carbon market auction: generator featured as low CO 2 intensity is not only willing to bid higher price but also willing to bid lower allowances, if keeping other things the same. Furthermore, total bid allowances is 3674.8 kiloton, almost double to environment regulator issued allowances, which means aggressive competition in carbon market. Of course it will bring about direct CO 2 saving effect. In wholesale market auction, generator's optimal supply function is given below. At price-quantity set 
Results and Discussion
Concretely, generators having bid electricity at all three sets their MPCS is upward ordered as generators 1, 2, 4, 3 and 5 in each set, which is in accordance with the order of respective bid price lower-bound in corresponding set. This result verified that wholesale market auction may prompt economic dispatch and resources allocation efficiency. Concerning bid quantity, generators 1-3 get market share restriction and generators 4-6 reach respective active power constraint. Because of either bid electricity set or bid price set is empty, generators 7-8 have no optimal supply curve in all price-quantity sets. This result also proved no physical withholding and high efficiency of the proposed dispatch model. In CO 2 submarket, generators 2-4 will purchase allowances from other generators at an expected price 63.25 CNY/ton or direct purchase allowances from environment regulator at 66.0 CNY/ton. Generator 5 will sell surplus allowances at an expected price 27.5 CNY/ton. It verified that generator's best policy in carbon market auction is evaluating CO 2 allowances for self-use, not speculation. Comparing with other dispatch models, allocating CO 2 allowances on average will emit 2047.0 kiloton CO 2 , allocating dispatched load on average will emit 2350.8 kiloton CO 2 , however the proposed dispatch model just emits 1665.4 kiloton CO 2 , meaning that 22.91% or 41.16% emissions is avoided. Therefore the CO 2 saving dispatch model can utilize both carbon market and wholesale market to optimize resources allocation, to incentivize generator controlling emission intensity and improving operational advantage, as a consequence brings about CO 2 mitigation effect.
Conclusions
Deep CO 2 mitigation provides a challenge to electricity sector during liberalized market process. To incentivize generator to carry out CO 2 mitigation through market mechanism, this article proposed an optimal CO 2 saving dispatch model for wholesale market under consideration of emissions trade. It works as a dynamic process of, (i) electricity and environment regulators coordinately issue regulatory information; (ii) initial CO 2 allowances allocation through carbon market auction; (iii) electricity transaction through wholesale market auction; and (iv) CO 2 allowances submarket transaction. This model couples carbon market with electricity market and utilizes price-quantity uncorrelated combinatorial auction to organize both CO 2 allowances and electric energy trade. By setting rigorous rule on CO 2 submarket transaction, it may avoid allowances speculation as well as windfall profits problem.
When making decision in both carbon market and electricity market generator needs to evaluate the profitability of CO 2 allowances, which means at each stage it needs to concern possible transaction in CO 2 submarket. This article builds two stochastic math programmings to depict generator's decision at each stage, which provides its bid curve for CO 2 allowances in carbon market and for selling electricity in wholesale market. Through adding up individual demand curve (supply curve) and matching with total allowances supplied (load demanded), market equilibrium is reached.
In carbon market bid price upper-bound (reserve price) of generators is ordered according to their operational advantage. The same is also true for allocated CO 2 allowances of each generator. These features have a benefit to improve market efficiency, as a consequence bring about direct CO 2 abatement effect. Likewise, in wholesale market bid price lower-bound (reserve price) is ordered in line with generators' operational advantage, meanwhile their bid electricity upper-bound gets respective capacity constraint or market share regulation. These features imply that the proposed CO 2 saving dispatch model can prompt economic dispatch, enhance resources allocation efficiency, consequently cause indirect CO 2 abatement effect. Numerical simulations also verified the effectiveness of this CO 2 saving dispatch model. 
